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Abstract: This paper reviews the rapidly growing empirical literature on the drivers of capital 
flows to emerging markets. The empirical evidence is structured based on the recognition 
that the drivers of capital flows vary over time and across different types of capital flows. The 
drivers are classified using the traditional “push vs. pull” framework, which is augmented by a 
distinction between cyclical and structural factors. Push factors are found to matter most for 
portfolio flows, somewhat less for banking flows, and least for FDI. Pull factors matter for all 
three components, but most for banking flows. A historical perspective suggests that the 
recent literature may have overemphasized the importance of cyclical factors at the 
expense of longer-term structural trends.  
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1. Introduction 
 
International capital flows play a central role in the global economy. They are closely tied to 
countries’ economic and financial conditions, impact macroeconomic policymaking, and 
bring a range of benefits and risks to recipient countries. While in absolute terms, most 
capital flows are between advanced economies, their importance for financial stability is 
greatest for emerging markets (EMs), which are particularly exposed to swings in the 
availability of foreign capital (Obstfeld 2012). Understanding the drivers of capital flows to 
EMs thus is important for the purpose of macroeconomic policy making, which is reflected in 
the significant scholarly interest the topic has attracted over time.  
 
The seminal work by Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993) and Fernandez-Arias (1996) 
introduced the distinction between country-specific “pull” factors and external “push” 
factors, providing the analytical framework for much of the empirical analysis since the early 
1990s. The push-pull framework has also proven useful for explaining the behavior of capital 
flows during and after the global financial crisis, which began in the United States, but 
quickly saw extensive spillovers to emerging markets, reviving the academic debate on the 
importance of external developments for EM capital inflows. The recent literature interprets 
the sharp retrenchment in foreign capital flows during the crisis primarily as the result of a 
powerful “push shock” in global risk aversion that prompted global investors to unwind their 
EM positions (Milesi Ferretti and Tille 2011). After the crisis, the focus in the literature shifted to 
another external factor, namely the impact of expansionary monetary policies in mature 
economies on EM capital flows – the very issue that was at the heart of Calvo, Leiderman 
and Reinhart’s 1993 paper.  
 
This survey takes stock of the empirical evidence on the drivers of capital flows to emerging 
markets by reviewing the sprawling research produced since the global financial crisis while 
also considering the extensive findings of the earlier literature. The contribution of this survey is 
to provide a comprehensive assessment of what we can say with relative confidence about 
the empirical drivers of EM capital flows. The literature makes use of a wide variety of 
concepts to measure and analyze capital flows, which means that it is critical to structure 
the wealth of empirical findings systematically. In this survey, the empirical evidence is 
organized along three dimensions: the time dimension (reviewing the historical evolution of 
the literature), the dependent variables (providing a taxonomy for the different types of 
capital flows), and the independent variables (evaluating the prevailing framework for the 
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drivers of capital flows). Building on this structure, a qualitative meta analysis is conducted for 
the key push and pull drivers of each of the major capital flows components. 
First, the historical overview sheds light on how evolving economic conditions have shaped 
the focus of the literature over time. For example, external factors have tended to receive 
particular attention during the early part of U.S. economic expansions, when interest rates 
are typically low and concerns about spillovers from Fed tightening are greatest (notably in 
the early 1990s, the early 2000s, and the extended low-interest period since 2009). By 
contrast, in the later stage of U.S. economic expansions, the focus has tended to shift to EM 
country-specific factors that attract capital flows and structural forces affecting EM capital 
flows. A pertinent example is the period of the late 1990s, when secular forces like the rise of 
institutional investors and innovations in information and communication technology 
received significant attention (e.g., World Bank 1997; Lopez-Mejia 1999). Since cyclical and 
structural forces are typically analyzed separately rather than in an integrated framework, 
there is a risk that the importance of structural forces for capital flows may be understated 
during periods like the present time, when U.S. interest rates are low and policy concerns are 
dominated by near-term cyclical developments.  
 
Second, the empirical evidence is structured according to the different concepts and 
measures of capital flows that are used in the literature. This distinction is important because 
the drivers of capital flows differ crucially depending on the specific concepts and data that 
are analyzed. For example, it is important to differentiate between capital inflows to an 
emerging market by non-residents and outward investment by the residents of an emerging 
market. For the most part, this survey focuses on non-resident capital flows to emerging 
markets. The drivers of capital flows also vary across components (like portfolio flows, FDI, 
and banking flows), differ between institutional and retail investors, and depend on the 
currency denomination and maturity of instruments, among other factors. Moreover, it is 
important to distinguish between data that directly measure international capital flows as 
defined in the standard balance of payments (BoP) framework from data that serve as an 
approximation to BoP capital flows, such as data on flows into investment funds and BIS data 
on cross-border bank claims. 
 
Third, this survey discusses the explanatory power of the prevailing “push vs. pull” framework, 
which distinguishes between external and domestic factors driving capital flows to emerging 
markets. The push-pull dichotomy provides a simple and intuitive classification of capital 
flows drivers, but it certainly has its limitations. For example, contagion effects and other 
forces related to investor behavior are difficult to classify as being either country-specific or 
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external in nature. In addition, some studies have challenged the push-pull framework by 
asserting that rather than looking at emerging and advanced economy developments 
separately, the focus should be on differentials between EM and advanced economy 
variables (such as interest rate differentials and growth differentials; see, for example, Ahmed 
and Zlate 2013; Herrmann and Mihaljek 2013). A comprehensive review of the literature 
suggests otherwise, however. Most empirical research concludes that emerging and 
advanced economy effects on EM capital inflows differ in magnitude and statistical 
significance, and sometimes even work in the same direction (as in the case of real GDP 
growth in mature economies, for which there is evidence that faster growth tends to support 
certain types of EM capital inflows). Therefore, it would be misleading to focus on differentials 
between emerging and advanced economy variables. Overall, this survey concludes that 
while there are clearly limitations to the push-pull dichotomy, it still offers a very helpful 
analytical framework. 
 
Building on this framework, I conduct a qualitative meta-analysis for the evidence on the key 
cyclical drivers of the major components of capital flows. The results from over 40 empirical 
studies are summarized in Figure 1, which is a simplified version of Figure 8 on page 26.  
 
Figure 1: Drivers of EM Capital Flows by Major Component 
 
 
Notes: The matrix summarizes the available evidence on the role of push and pull factors for the major capital flows 
components. For example, the red cell in the top left corner of the matrix indicates that there is strong evidence 
that an increase in global risk aversion leads to a reduction in portfolio equity flows to emerging markets.  
 
Source: author’s illustration. 
Driver Portfolio 
Equity
Portfolio 
Debt
Banking 
Flows
FDI
  Global risk aversion − − − ?
Push   Mature economy interest rates − − − ?
  Mature economy output growth + + ? ?
 Domestic output growth + + + +
Pull  Asset return indicators + + + ?
 Country risk indicators − − − −
+
+
?
−
−   Strong evidence for negative relationship
Type
  Strong evidence for positive relationship
  Some evidence for positive relationship
  Mixed evidence, no clear relationship
  Some evidence for negative relationship
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Push factors are found to matter most for portfolio flows, somewhat less for banking flows, and 
least for FDI. Specifically, there is evidence that increased global risk aversion has a strong 
adverse effect on portfolio and banking flows, but not on FDI. In addition, there is strong 
evidence that lower interest rates in mature economies push portfolio capital to emerging 
markets, especially into bond markets. There is also some evidence for such an effect for 
banking flows, while results for FDI flows are mixed. Pull factors are found to matter for all three 
components, but most for banking flows. Domestic output growth is the determinant that is 
most consistently found to show a strong and statistically robust relationship with the four 
types of capital flows. Greater country risk also appears to reduce all types of capital flows 
considered, although the evidence is not as robust and there are some exceptions for those 
country risk measures that reflect increased financing needs, such as a widening current 
account deficit. Local asset returns seem to attract banking flows the most, followed by 
portfolio investment, while the evidence is mixed for FDI. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 puts the scope of this survey into the 
broader context of the literature on EM capital flows. Section 3 provides some theoretical 
background on the rationale for the existence of international capital flows. Section 4 
reviews the historical evolution of the literature on the drivers of EM capital flows. Section 5 
provides a classification of the different concepts of capital flows that are commonly 
analyzed, while Section 6 discusses the “push-pull” framework for capital flows drivers. 
Section 7 looks in detail at the drivers of the major components of capital flows. Section 8 
discusses the main conclusions and provides guidance on future research. 
 
 
 
2. Relationship between Surveyed Literature and other Literature Strands 
 
The literature on international capital flows is voluminous, reflecting the central role of 
international capital flows in the global economy. In order to situate the present survey in the 
broader context of the capital flows literature, it is useful to divide that literature into three 
broad categories (Figure 2): the causes, effects, and policy implications of capital flows. The 
first area on the causes (or “drivers”) of capital flows examines the various factors that affect 
the volume, composition, and dynamic behavior of capital flows to EM economies. This is the 
focus of the present survey. The second area of research is primarily concerned with the 
economic impact of capital flows on recipient countries, including the potential benefits of 
capital flows (such as higher investment and growth) as well as the potential costs in terms of 
financial stability and risks associated with capital flows reversals (surveys on the costs and 
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benefits of capital flows include Prasad et al. 2003 and Henry 2007). The third area considers 
a wide range of policy issues, including macroeconomic and macroprudential policy 
responses to capital inflow surges, policy prescriptions for capital account liberalization and 
for the use of capital controls, optimal reserve policies and the choice of exchange rate 
regimes (some surveys include Dooley 1995, BIS 2009, Ostry et al. 2010, and Alistair 2014).  
 
Figure 2: Stylized Illustration of the Major Literature Strands on EM Capital Flows  
 
 
Source: author’s illustration. 
 
To the extent possible, I will avoid discussions on the latter two areas of research and instead 
refer to existing surveys. The transition between the three areas is fluid, however, and some 
aspects pertaining to the capital flows behavior, consequences and policies have an 
important bearing on the drivers of capital flows. For example, some authors have examined 
how policy measures such as capital controls affect the subsequent volume and 
composition of capital inflows (e.g., Montiel and Reinhart 1999; Forbes et al. 2012). 
Conversely, the literature on the drivers of capital flows has important implications for the 
other two areas of research. For example, the appropriate policy response to a capital 
inflows surge may depend on whether flows are driven by external or domestic factors 
(Calvo et al. 1993). Similarly, the long-term economic impact of capital flows on the recipient 
economy is likely to differ depending on whether inflows are primarily cyclical or structural in 
nature (Prasad et al. 2003). 
 
 
Drivers of 
Capital Flows
Policies    
Addressing 
Capital Flows
Effects of
Capital Flows
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3. Theoretical Context 
 
Before delving into the empirical determinants of EM capital inflows, it is helpful to review the 
theoretical rationale for the existence of international capital flows. For this purpose, it is 
necessary to distinguish between net capital flows and gross capital flows. Net capital flows 
are the mirror image of the current account balance (adjusted for changes in reserves, 
capital transfers, and errors and omissions), i.e. a current account deficit is typically reflected 
in positive net capital flows (International Monetary Fund 2010). By contrast, gross capital 
flows look at resident outward investment and foreign inward investment separately (i.e., 
they capture two-way capital flows that reflect the changes in assets and liabilities in the 
financial account). For the purpose of this survey, the dynamics of gross capital flows are 
most relevant. The main reason is that it is the two-way flows of international investment, 
lending, and financial intermediation that characterize a country’s integration into global 
financial markets (Borio and Disyatat 2011).  
 
The rationales for net and gross capital flows have in common that both types of flows 
enable welfare gains on the production side (i.e. a more productive allocation of capital) 
and on the consumption side (i.e. a superior consumption path for the providers and 
recipients capital). Figure 3 provides a stylized overview of those benefits. 
 
Figure 3: Stylized Overview of the Theoretical Benefits of Net and Gross Capital Flows 
 
Source: author’s illustration. 
 
The theoretical benefits of net capital flows can be illustrated in the context of the 
intertemporal approach to the current account (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995). In this approach, 
net capital flows are viewed as an exchange of assets in return for goods and services. 
Assets entitle their owner to future consumption, while goods and services are used for 
Production Benefits Consumption Benefits
  N et Flows
More efficient allocation
of global capital 
(higher returns for given amount     
of risk)
Improved intertemporal
consumption path
(smoothing known/expected 
variations in income and returns)
  Gross Flows
Riskier, but more productive
allocation of global capital
(higher return and more risk that     
is better diversified)
Reduced state-dependent
variability of income 
(smoothing unknown/ random 
variations in income and returns)
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present consumption. Hence, in this framework, net capital flows are interpreted as 
intertemporal trade, i.e. present consumption is traded against future consumption. Net 
capital flows thus allow domestic consumption and saving to be separated from domestic 
investment. Countries with high returns on capital will receive net capital flows from abroad 
to finance investment until their rate of return equals the world rate of return. Hence, on the 
production side, the rationale behind net capital flows is that resources can flow from 
countries with low returns on capital to countries with high returns on capital, resulting in a 
more efficient allocation of global capital.2   
 
On the consumption side, the rationale behind net capital flows is to enable countries to 
achieve an improved intertemporal consumption path by allowing them to smooth 
consumption in the face of known or expected variations in their national income. A classic 
example is the case of an oil-exporting country that uses present income from oil exports to 
accumulate external assets that will help finance future consumption when its natural 
resources are depleted (Sachs 1981).  
 
By contrast, gross capital flows refer to trade in assets for other assets (referred to as 
“intratemporal trade” in the intertemporal approach to the current account). On the 
production side, the benefits of gross capital flows arise because international risk-sharing 
makes it possible to allocate capital to projects with higher risks and returns than if all the 
associated risk had to be borne by a narrower set of investors located within a particular 
country. This allows a riskier allocation of global capital that is more productive on average 
(Arrow 1971). The resulting welfare gains benefit both the providers of capital (via higher 
returns) and the recipients of capital (via faster economic growth). For example, Obstfeld 
(1994) shows in a theoretical model how international risk sharing can produce significant 
welfare gains through a world portfolio shift towards riskier assets. The production benefits of 
gross vs. net flows may be contrasted in that net flows enable a higher return for a given 
amount of risk, while gross capital flows help achieve a higher return while taking on more risk 
that is better diversified. 
 
In addition, gross capital flows also enable benefits on the consumption side. Portfolio 
diversification allows investors to share risks internationally and trade across different states 
                                                 
2 Lucas (1990) discusses why, against the predictions of standard economic theory, net capital has tended to flow 
“uphill” from emerging to mature economies, a phenomenon dubbed the “Lucas paradox.” However, Alfaro et al. 
(2011) show that sovereign-to-sovereign lending can explain upstream capital flows, and that net private capital 
flows are positively correlated with countries’ productivity growth. Moreover, emerging markets have generally 
been net recipients of foreign capital in recent decades if international reserve accumulation is excluded (IIF 2015). 
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of nature, enabling the providers of capital to protect themselves against concentrated risks 
(Grubel 1968; Obstfeld 1994a). As a result, the residents of a country engaging in 
intratemporal trade achieve a smoother consumption path. For example, when a country is 
hit by a natural disaster, household incomes and business profitability will decline. If the 
country’s businesses are predominantly foreign-owned, some of the losses are borne by non-
residents, reducing residents’ exposure to this particular risk.  The consumption benefits of 
gross capital flows thus arise by diversifying across unknown or random variations in incomes 
and returns, in contrast to the benefits of net flows that stem from known or expected 
variations in incomes or returns.   
 
It is worth noting that the consumption benefits of gross capital flows from portfolio 
diversification accrue to the individual investor, while the other three types of benefits are 
more widely shared among the residents of countries participating in the international 
exchange of assets. As a result, it is this fourth category of benefits that is most consequential 
for guiding investor behavior and hence most relevant for the push-pull literature on the 
drivers of capital flows.  
 
The ”push-pull” framework for the drivers of capital flows emerged from the empirical 
literature without an explicit motivation by economic theory. That said, there is a compelling 
link between the empirical push and pull drivers of capital flows and the theoretical 
framework provided above. The role of external vs. domestic drivers can be understood in 
the context of modern portfolio theory, which provides the theoretical foundation for 
portfolio diversification and thus for the consumption benefits of gross capital flows illustrated 
in the bottom right quadrant of Figure 3. The foundations of modern portfolio theory were 
laid by Markovitz’s (1952) seminal work on portfolio selection and later expanded to the 
international context by Grubel (1968). Markovitz motivates portfolio diversification by 
postulating that rational investors should care about two main factors, expected returns and 
risk (or variance). Thus, the portfolio share of a particular asset will depend on its expected 
return and risk relative to other investable assets.  
 
Against the backdrop of modern portfolio theory, pull factors can be thought of as factors 
that affect the expected return and/or risk of EM assets (Chuhan et al. 1998), while push 
factors can be thought of as affecting primarily the characteristics of other investable assets 
to which EM assets are being compared by investors. For example, on the pull side stronger 
domestic output growth raises expected returns on equities; more favorable country risk 
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indicators may reduce the variance of asset prices; and more favorable return indicators 
may point to stronger performance in the future. 
 
On the push side, higher external interest rates make it more attractive to invest in non-EM 
assets, such as U.S. Treasuries. A similar argument could be made for external output growth, 
although there are a number of confounding effects that obscure the relationship between 
external growth and capital flows to EMs (discussed in Section 6). Moreover, push drivers of 
capital flows may be factors that shift investors’ risk-return preference, represented by a shift 
along the efficient frontier in the framework of modern portfolio theory (Merton 1972). Since 
emerging market assets are generally viewed as high-risk assets, a shift in investor 
preferences towards a lower expected return at a lower risk would tend to reduce investor 
demand for EM assets. Consistent with this notion, the empirical literature highlights investor 
risk appetite as a key external factor affecting capital flows to emerging markets. 
 
It is worth noting that the framework of modern portfolio theory is most relevant for explaining 
portfolio equity and debt flows, and to a lesser extent may help explain changes in banks’ 
international loan portfolios. By contrast, the framework is less applicable to FDI flows, which 
are subject to additional considerations, including strategic decision-making by multinational 
enterprises.  
 
 
 
4. Historical Evolution of the Empirical Literature on the Drivers of EM Capital Flows 
 
In order to provide a thorough review of the current state of the literature it is helpful to 
consider the economic developments from which this literature emerged and the key issues 
it aimed to address over time.3 The early literature on the drivers of capital flows emerged in 
the context of the rebound in flows to Latin America in the early 1990s. The Latin American 
economies had suffered significant dislocations from the debt crises of the 1980s, in part due 
to a boom-bust cycle in foreign bank lending. In the late 1980s, many of these economies 
underwent major economic reforms, including inflation stabilization programs, privatization 
programs, and the liberalization of local equity markets (Calvo et al. 1992; Taylor and Sarno 
1997). At the same time, the U.S. economy was in recession in 1990-91, which resulted in 
unusually low interest rates in the U.S. and other mature economies. When capital inflows to 
Latin America rebounded in the early 1990s, the question was whether these flows reflected 
improved access to external financing as a reward for improved macroeconomic 
                                                 
3 A more comprehensive survey of the early literature is provided by Lopez-Mejia (1999). 
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fundamentals, or if instead flows were driven by favorable external circumstances that were 
likely to reverse. This question was first raised in the seminal paper by Calvo, Leiderman and 
Reinhart (1993), who argued that the cyclical downturn in the U.S. had been a major driver 
behind rebound in capital inflows to Latin American countries. The authors used principal 
component analysis to assess the degree of co-movement between various U.S. variables 
(interest rates, equity and real estate returns) and a proxy of capital flows to Latin American 
economies (monthly data on reserve accumulation and real exchange rate appreciation). 
Their finding of significant co-movement between U.S. variables and their capital inflow 
proxy seemed to suggest that external factors were indeed playing a major role in driving 
capital flows.  
 
Subsequent studies pointed out various limitations in the approach taken by Calvo et al. 
(1993) and addressed these shortcomings by introducing domestic control variables, 
extending the sample period, and using data on capital flows as the dependent variable 
(rather than a mere proxy). These subsequent studies generally found further support for the 
view that capital inflows were to a large extent driven by external factors (e.g., Fernandez-
Arias 1996; Taylor and Sarno 1997). 
 
This view was not unanimous, however. For example, Ghosh and Ostry (1993) found for a 
large group of EM economies that domestic economic fundamentals were the predominant 
driver of capital flows. Their findings were based on a theoretical model of intertemporal 
current account determination, whose predictions were largely consistent with observed 
capital flows. Other authors further attested to the importance of pull factors. For example, 
Chuhan et al. (1998) looked at the behavior of monthly gross capital inflows from the U.S. to 
a sample of 18 countries in Latin America and EM Asia. Using a panel approach with country 
fixed effects, they found that domestic factors are at least as important in driving capital 
flows as external factors, especially in Emerging Asia.  
 
While it seemed plausible in the early 1990s that the cyclical downturn in the U.S. had 
contributed to the surge in EM capital flows, this notion became more difficult to uphold 
when capital flows continued during the subsequent acceleration in U.S. real GDP growth 
and rising policy interest rates. Capital inflows generally continued their upward trend in the 
mid-1990s, notwithstanding some major setbacks such as the 1994/1995 Mexico crisis. Other 
factors thus seemed to be at work that would support such a sustained increase in capital 
inflows. A World Bank (1997) study argued that structural changes were behind this trend. 
These included the rise of institutional investors in mature economies, the deregulation of 
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financial markets in both emerging and mature economies, as well as the impact of new 
information and communication technology. Earlier studies on the topic had not considered 
the impact of these structural changes and arguably may have overemphasized the 
importance of cyclical factors. In addition, the World Bank study argued that behavioral 
factors such as learning on the part of international investors had resulted in greater country 
differentiation, increasing the relative importance of pull factors over time. 
 
In the mid-2000s, the literature increasingly focused on the drivers of flows to individual 
emerging market regions as well as specific components of capital flows. For example, Baek 
(2006) used a panel with country fixed effects for 9 emerging economies in two regions, 
finding that push factors tend to be more important for portfolio flows to Emerging Asia than 
to Latin America. De Vita and Kyaw (2008a) estimated a structural VAR model for 5 EM 
economies that suggested that EM productivity growth is more important for FDI flows than 
portfolio flows, while the domestic money supply is the dominant driver of portfolio inflows. 
FDI flows received particular attention in this period, reflecting the rapid growth of direct 
investment in emerging markets from an average of $40 billion per year in the early 1990s to 
an annual average of $300 billion in the mid-2000s (Institute of International Finance 2015a). 
For example, Albuquerque et al. (2005) investigated the connection between world market 
integration and FDI flows, finding that global factors had increased in importance, while 
local factors such as productivity growth, trade openness, and financial depth had become 
less important. 
 
The global crisis of 2008/2009 sparked a major retrenchment of global capital flows, which 
soon became the subject of extensive academic inquiry. The crisis shifted the focus of the 
literature squarely on gross capital flows (i.e. the changes in external assets and liabilities, as 
distinct from net flows, which are captured by the financial account balance). Gross capital 
in- and outflows exhibited rapid growth in the period leading up to the crisis and saw sharp 
movements during the crisis itself. Early work on measuring the gross positions of international 
claims was done by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001; 2007), documenting the remarkable rise in 
countries’ gross external assets and liabilities. Obstfeld (2012) addresses the rise in flows 
during the years preceding the crisis, when gross capital flows far outpaced net flows, and 
concludes that gross external positions and their associated flows are the primary 
transmission channel of financial instability. Broner et al. (2013) find supporting empirical 
evidence by analyzing the cyclical behavior of gross capital flows to and from a sample of 
103 low-, middle- and high-income countries. They find that gross capital flows have been 
much more volatile than net flows, especially during economic downturns. In addition, gross 
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capital flows are found to be highly pro-cyclical, with both non-resident inflows and resident 
outflows of capital rising during economic expansions and declining during recessions.  
 
In the post-crisis period, particular attention has also been devoted to the co-movement of 
(gross) capital flows across different components and regions. For example, a study by Milesi-
Ferretti and Tille (2011) documents how the behavior of various capital flows components 
varied during the financial crisis, with banking flows contracting the most and FDI flows the 
least. Forbes and Warnock (2012) present a systematic framework for analyzing extreme 
episodes of capital flows, which are classified into four categories: surges (of non-resident 
inflows), stops (of non-resident inflows), flight (of resident outward investment), and 
retrenchment (of resident outward investment). In this framework, most of the extreme 
episodes countries experienced between 1980 and 2009 were driven by external factors, 
notably global risk aversion. This result is confirmed by Ghosh et al. (2014a), who find that the 
single most important factor behind liability-driven surges is global risk aversion (as measured 
by the VIX). 
 
During the last several years, significant attention has been devoted to the role of 
exceptionally loose monetary conditions in driving capital flows to emerging markets, with 
particular focus on the Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing programs. Fratzscher et al. 
(2012) find a significant impact of central bank asset purchases on EM asset prices and 
portfolio flows using weekly data on flows to EM-dedicated funds from Emerging Portfolio 
Fund Research (EPFR) Global. By contrast, in a Federal Reserve discussion paper, Ahmed and 
Zlate (2013) find that unconventional U.S. monetary policy has left the volume of flows 
unaffected, but has shifted the composition of capital inflows towards portfolio investments. 
A more recent study by the World Bank (2014) concludes that the Fed’s three quantitative 
easing programs have had a significant, but diminishing impact on the volume of EM capital 
flows over time. A limitation of this study, however, is that the impact of Fed asset purchases 
is not modeled explicitly and is instead estimated as a residual. Koepke (2014) takes a 
broader approach on the impact of U.S. monetary policy by focusing on shifts in market 
expectations for future Fed policy interest rates, which are found to be an important 
determinant of portfolio flows to EM economies, especially bond flows. This relationship is 
established for both EPFR fund flows data and BoP-consistent monthly portfolio flows data. 
Dahlhaus and Vasishtha (2014) build on this framework and confirm in a cross-country 
comparative analysis that Fed policy expectations have been an important determinant of 
equity and especially bond flows in recent years, particularly during the “Taper Tantrum” of 
2013. 
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Overall, the academic focus has shifted substantially over time, reflecting changing 
economic circumstances, increasing data availability, and the growing role of emerging 
markets in the global economy. One recurring pattern is that the literature has tended to 
focus on cyclical push factors during and after U.S. recessions, while the other periods have 
seen greater focus on pull factors and secular forces shaping the evolution of capital flows. 
This may be in part because the relative importance of the drivers of capital flows 
themselves changes over time, for example due to changes in the magnitude of external 
and domestic shocks. In particular, Fratzscher (2012) finds that push factors were the 
dominant drivers of portfolio fund flows during the global financial crisis, while in the years 
after the financial crisis, portfolio flows responded more strongly to pull factors such as 
macroeconomic fundamentals, institutions and policies of recipient countries. In addition, Lo 
Duca (2012) specifically investigates the extent to which push and pull factors vary over time 
using a time varying coefficient model. He finds that pull factors are more important when 
risk aversion is elevated, although extreme risk aversion generates panics where local 
developments play only a small role in shaping capital flows. 
 
 
5. Classification of Capital Flows Analyzed in the Literature 
 
A systematic review of the literature on the drivers of capital flows is complicated by two 
particular challenges. First, there are a number of different ways to measure international 
capital flows (and for each measure, there are often a range of datasets available). 
Second, there are a large number of potential explanatory variables for movements in 
capital flows, reflecting the central role of capital flows in the global financial system and the 
countless forces that may in principle affect international movements of capital. For any 
empirical analysis, this means that there are many choices for both the dependent and the 
independent variables, resulting in a very large number of possible combinations. In order to 
structure the discussion, it is thus helpful to introduce some classifications for both dependent 
and independent variables, which are discussed in this section and the next, respectively. 
Figure 4 provides an overview of relevant categories for analyzing capital flows. 
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Figure 4: Classification of Capital Flows 
 
Source: author’s illustration. 
 
It is worth noting that for each of these measures of capital flows, there are a number of 
different ways to scale and adjust flows for the purpose of empirical analysis. The most 
appropriate form to use in an econometric analysis is likely to depend on the specific 
research objective. A helpful overview of capital flows specifications used in the empirical 
literature is provided by Ahmed et al. (2015, pp. 2-3), who list and discuss studies using as 
dependent variable “the dollar amount of flows, flows normalized by average past flows, log 
changes in portfolio positions, flows as a percent of lagged portfolio size, changes in the 
portfolio share, flows scaled by local market capitalization, and flows scaled by local GDP.”  
 
Residency of Investor 
A key distinction is between gross and net capital flows. In balance of payments 
terminology, this distinction corresponds to changes in the liabilities of an emerging market 
country versus changes in its assets (International Monetary Fund 2010). Net capital flows are 
obtained by netting changes in liabilities against changes in assets.4  
In the early literature, the distinction between gross and net capital flows was of little 
importance because up to the early 1990s, EM resident capital outflows were typically quite 
small (Figure 5). Therefore, net capital flows essentially reflected purchases and sales of EM 
assets by non-residents. Over time, however, EM resident outflows rose to sizeable amounts, 
meaning that the behavior of non-resident flows could no longer be approximated by net 
capital flows. To the extent that non-resident flows do not coincide with net capital flows, the 
literature on the drivers of capital flows (and this survey) generally focus on non-resident 
                                                 
4 If available, data on gross flows provide more information since actions by resident and non-resident investors can 
be analyzed separately (United Nations 2009). In principle, netting can be done in the same asset category (e.g., 
net FDI flows) or in groups of asset categories (i.e., overall net capital flows). 
 Basis for Distinction  Main Examples
 Residency of investor  EM resident capital flows, non-resident capital flows, net capital flows
 Component  FDI, portfolio equity, portfolio debt, bank lending
 Type of investor  Retail and institutional investors
 Data frequency  Annual, quarterly, monthly, weekly, daily
 Official vs. private sector  Private investors vs. offical lending; private sector recipients vs. public sector borrowing
 Currency  Local currency, foreign currency
 Maturity  Short vs. long term (debt flows), indefinite (equity flows)
 Geography  EM Asia, EM Europe, Latin America, Africa, Middle East, individual countries
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capital flows (although there are notable exceptions, such as Reinhart and Reinhart 2008; 
and Ghosh et al. 2014a).  
The main reason why the focus is on non-resident capital flows is that EM economies are 
typically most affected by the actions of foreign investors (Ostry et al. 2010; Broner et al. 
2013). Non-resident flows are generally the more volatile component, especially during crisis 
periods, making them an important driver of exchange rates, domestic interest rates, and 
financial conditions more broadly. By contrast, EM resident capital outflows are more 
geographically concentrated in a limited number of countries that are large exporters of oil 
and other commodities. Meanwhile, net capital flows provide a narrower picture of external 
financing that is more closely linked to transactions in goods and services. In addition, net 
capital flows are jointly determined with the current account balance and the official 
settlements balance, each of which is subject to its own unique driving factors (see, for 
example, Debelle and Faruqee 1996; Chinn and Prasad 2003).  
Figure 5 
 
Most data sources on international capital flows clearly fit into one category within the 
residence-based framework, but there are exceptions. One example is BIS data on 
consolidated cross-border banking statistics, which include international banks’ local claims, 
i.e. loans by their subsidiaries. Hence, the consolidated data are not consistent with balance 
of payments data, which only include transactions between residents and non-residents (see 
also Takats 2010 and BIS 2012; by contrast, BIS locational banking statistics are also compiled 
using a residence-based approach).  
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Another example is EPFR Global’s data on flows in and out of funds that invest in emerging 
markets. While these flows are often used as a proxy for BoP portfolio flows (Miao and Pant 
2012), the discrepancy between the two measures is quite large (Figure 6). Fund flows are 
also quite different conceptually as they measure net flows into an investment vehicle rather 
than transactions between the residents of different countries (for a more detailed 
discussion, see Koepke and Mohammed 2014a). While fund flows are certainly of significant 
scholarly interest on their own merits, there are justified questions about the degree to which 
empirical findings based on fund flows also apply to international capital flows.  
Figure 6 
 
Capital Flows Components 
Following the IMF’s standard balance of payments presentation, capital flows can be broken 
down into four main components: foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio equity investment, 
portfolio debt investment, and “other” investment, which includes bank lending 
(International Monetary Fund 2010). Capital flows differ greatly in scale and scope across 
these components, and so do their drivers. Because it so important to distinguish among the 
major components of capital flows, Section 7 of this survey is devoted to analyzing the drivers 
of each of the major components of capital flows.  
FDI involves transactions where the investor owns a substantial portion of a firm’s shares and 
typically exercises a degree of managerial control (International Monetary Fund 2010). In 
addition, FDI transactions often involve the ownership of physical plants and equipment. 
Therefore, direct investment flows are driven largely by long-term considerations about the 
real economy and less subject to short-term financial fluctuations (see, for example, Addison 
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and Heshmati 2003; Biglaiser and DeRouen 2006). In most countries, FDI flows are the largest 
source of external financing, with total gross FDI inflows typically accounting for 40-60 
percent of aggregate capital flows to emerging markets since the mid-1990s (Institute of 
International Finance 2015a). Blonigen (2005) provides a survey specifically on the 
determinants of FDI flows, covering flows to both emerging and mature economies.  
By contrast, portfolio equity and debt flows involve transactions that can, in principle, be 
executed very quickly. Some investors may adjust the composition of their portfolios in 
response to economic news and short-term fluctuations on financial markets. This is reflected 
in empirical evidence showing that a range of financial variables are important drivers of 
portfolio flows, including asset returns, exchange rate volatility, and external financial 
volatility indicators that indicate the degree of investor risk aversion (see, for example, 
Montiel and Reinhart 1999; Baek 2006; Broner et al. 2013).  
Finally, banking flows are often analyzed as another separate category, reflecting the 
special status of the banking system as a financial intermediary (Buch 2002). There are 
various approaches to analyzing banking flows. Most studies that focus specifically on 
banking flows make use of BIS data on cross border bank claims, which include both bank 
lending as well as banks’ holdings of debt and equity securities and other assets. Note that 
this concept differs from the standard balance of payments classification, where bank loans 
are included in the category “other investment,” while all transactions in debt and equity 
securities (including those by banks) are included in the portfolio debt and equity investment 
categories, respectively (International Monetary Fund 2010).  
 
Type of Investor 
Institutional investors are likely to have different investment objectives from retail investors, 
and hence are likely to respond differently to changes in the economic and financial 
environment. For example, institutions like sovereign wealth funds, insurance companies and 
pension funds generally have long-term mandates that allow them to ride out short-run 
fluctuations on financial markets (BIS 2007). Hedge funds are an exception as they tend to 
place much greater emphasis on short term tactical asset allocation and adjust positions 
frequently (Tsatsaronis 2000). By contrast, mutual funds are predominantly owned by retail 
investors who may withdraw their capital during times of financial stress (IMF 2014). Mutual 
fund investments are an area of research where fund flows data can provide quite detailed 
insights into investor behavior. For example, Raddatz and Schmukler (2012) find evidence of 
a destabilizing effect of mutual funds by analyzing the interplay between actions of ultimate 
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investors (i.e. the owners of fund shares) and fund managers. They conclude that mutual 
funds tend to exacerbate the pro-cyclicality of capital flows to emerging markets. Gelos 
(2011) provides a survey on the behavior of international mutual funds and the implications 
for capital flows. 
 
Data Frequency 
Capital flows data exist at frequencies ranging from daily to annual data and are published 
with various time lags. The lower the frequency, the more complete the dataset tends to be, 
but the more difficult it is to capture the impact of short term developments and rapid shifts 
in investor behavior. In recent years, the literature has increasingly focused on high-
frequency data sources serving as proxies for EM capital flows, such as fund flows data (see, 
for example, Fratzscher et al. 2012; Lo Duca 2012; Feroli et al. 2014). A comparison of 
empirical results across different studies suggests that the relative importance of capital flows 
drivers differs across data frequencies. For portfolio flows, the evidence suggests that external 
factors (especially risk aversion) are the dominant drivers of short run movements, while pull 
factors (especially macroeconomic conditions) seem to be less important at high 
frequencies and matter more for long-term trends. For example, Fratzscher (2012) and 
Koepke (2014) find only a limited role for domestic macroeconomic variables at the weekly 
and monthly frequencies, respectively, while Baek (2006) and De Vita and Kyaw (2008a) find 
strong evidence for the role of domestic output growth at the quarterly frequency. These 
results are consistent with Ananchotikul and Zhang (2014), who find based on weekly fund 
flows data that the contributions from external factors are much more volatile, while those of 
pull factors are small at high frequencies but more persistent. A promising avenue for future 
research would be to compare push and pull drivers systematically using a common 
methodological approach across different frequencies for the various capital flows 
components.  
Official vs. Private Sector Flows 
Another useful distinction is by the economic sector that provides the capital as well as the 
sector using the capital. While capital provided by the private sector can be expected to be 
driven by risk-return considerations, this may not be the case for official lending provided by 
international financial institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund or 
by bilateral official creditors (Gupta and Ratha 2000). Alfaro et al. (2011) address this 
question by separating flows from private sector sources and official flows such as official aid 
and reserve accumulation. The authors find evidence that private flows are indeed driven 
predominantly by economic factors such as productivity growth, consistent with theory, 
 20 
 
while official flows are not determined by these factors. Most of the literature (and this survey) 
focuses on the determinants of private sector sources of capital.  
 
On the recipient side, creditworthiness and risk-return characteristics are likely to differ 
between securities issued by the public and the private sector, meaning that investors may 
take into account different factors when making investment decisions. In addition, equity 
flows are almost always directed to the private sector (except when the target company is 
partially state-owned), while bonds may be issued by either government entities or 
companies. The literature (and this survey) addresses capital flows to both public and private 
sector recipients, although most studies do not differentiate between the two.  
 
Currency 
Up to the early 2000s, emerging markets typically borrowed in “hard” currency, notably in 
U.S. dollars (Burger et al. 2012). Since then, there has been rapid growth in local currency 
bond markets, against the “original sin” hypothesis, according to which emerging markets 
would not be able to borrow in their own currencies in large scale (e.g., Eichengreen and 
Hausmann 1999; 2005). Depending on the currency denomination of the securities issued, 
different factors are likely to matter for attracting foreign investors and lenders. For example, 
hard currency investors should be concerned about EM exchange depreciation primarily to 
the extent that the borrower’s ability to service debt and repay principal is affected. By 
contrast, for local currency debt, exchange rate depreciation directly affects foreign 
investors’ returns. Hence, the domestic inflation performance and central bank credibility 
should matter much more for local currency debt than foreign currency debt. Consistent 
with this, Burger and Warnock (2007) find that countries with a better inflation track record 
and creditor friendly policies have been able to issue more debt in local currency. In 
addition, Burger et al. (2012) find that flows into securities in local currency are particularly 
driven by investor-friendly institutions, regulations and policies (e.g., fewer capital controls), 
market liquidity, and creditor rights.  
 
Maturity 
For debt flows, the determinants are likely to vary depending on the maturity of credit, given 
the differences in risk-return characteristics and rollover risks. Notably, the price of a long-
dated bond is more sensitive to changes in interest rates compared to a bond with a short 
remaining maturity. Consistent with this, there is evidence that flows into short-term bonds 
tend to be less sensitive to changes in mature economy interest rates compared to bonds 
with longer remaining maturities (Koepke 2014). On the other hand, short-term borrowing 
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involves greater rollover risks for the issuer, which can lead to funding pressures during 
periods of emerging market stress. Indeed, Rodrik and Velasco (1999) find that greater short 
term borrowing increases the probability and severity of financial crises in emerging markets. 
 
Regional and Country Differences 
Studies frequently distinguish between various emerging market regions and contrast the 
behavior across these different groupings (e.g. Taylor and Sarno 1997; Baek 2006, and Förster 
et al. 2014). It is plausible that the determinants of capital flows differ systematically across 
countries, for example due to structural factors, such as whether a country is a major 
exporter of a particular commodity. In addition, empirical results may differ across studies 
because different country samples are used. In some cases, this may be due to different 
definitions of which countries are classified as emerging markets. EM country groupings differ 
between various international organizations like the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank, and private sector organizations such as Morgan Stanley Capital International (which 
provides benchmark equity indices like the MSCI Emerging Market index). 
 
 
 
6. Classification and Discussion of Capital Flows Drivers  
 
Push-Pull Framework  
The distinction between push and pull factors for capital flows has been the dominant 
intellectual framework for classifying drivers since the focus of academic inquiry shifted to 
the role of external factors in the early 1990s. The appeal of this framework is that it is simple 
and intuitive, and yet is able to capture most of the key drivers of capital flows. From the 
perspective of an emerging market country, most of the relevant macroeconomic and 
financial developments affecting capital flows can be classified as being either domestic or 
external in nature. For example, domestic economic performance, asset return indicators, 
and country risk indicators stand out as important variables in emerging market economies 
that are found to have a significant bearing on capital flows. Similarly, mature economy 
interest rates and global risk aversion are unambiguously external in nature and have 
significant explanatory power for capital flows movements.  
 
However, there are also several important caveats regarding the push-pull framework. Some 
factors do not seem to fit into either the external or the domestic category, such as the 
behavioral responses of international investors to local market developments. For example, 
contagion effects may arise through the interaction of country-specific developments (such 
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as the deterioration in vulnerability indicators) and a flight-to-safety response by global 
investors (Calvo and Reinhart 1996). Such contagion effects are the subject of a separate, 
voluminous literature (for an overview, see Forbes and Rigobon 2001). Significant attention 
has also been devoted to contagion stemming from investment funds and their ultimate 
investors, which is surveyed in Gelos (2011). Other aspects of investor behavior are also 
closely linked to country-level developments, such as the degree to which investors shift their 
portfolios away from or towards assets whose prices have previously increased/declined 
(“rebalancing vs. return chasing,” Bohn and Tesar 1996; Curcuru et al. 2011). Similarly, the 
effects of information asymmetries and transaction costs cannot be fully captured by the 
push-pull framework (Portes and Rey 2005). 
 
In addition, there may be important interactions between external conditions and country 
fundamentals that are difficult to capture with the push-pull framework. For example, 
domestic asset return indicators are found to be an important determinant of portfolio and 
banking flows, but it is difficult to disentangle whether observed asset price movements are 
driven by domestic or external developments. Similarly, interactions between external and 
domestic variables also obscure the picture for real economy variables and country risk 
indicators. A classic example explored by Fernandez-Arias (1996) is the positive effect of low 
U.S. interest rates on the creditworthiness of EM borrowers, which in turn encourages foreign 
capital inflows. He finds that the improvement in the creditworthiness of emerging markets in 
the early 1990s was primarily attributable to the decline in international interest rates and 
argues that the resulting increase in foreign inflows should not be interpreted as having been 
driven by domestic factors. Another example for such endogeneity issues is domestic real 
GDP growth, since capital flows are not only attracted by faster growth but also support 
such growth (for a recent discussion, see, for example, Kyaw and MacDonald 2009). These 
endogeneities make it notoriously difficult to establish true causal relationships for the drivers 
of capital flows. 
 
Another argument raised against the push-pull framework is that for certain variables, both 
sets of factors may potentially be viewed as two sides of the same coin. If an increase in EM 
growth has the same impact on capital flows as a decline in mature economy growth of the 
same magnitude, then it is the growth differential that determines capital flows (Ahmed and 
Zlate 2013). However, a critical reading of the empirical literature does not support this view 
as there is substantial evidence that the EM and advanced economy effects on capital 
flows are quite different. While there is robust evidence that stronger EM real GDP growth 
tends to boost EM capital inflows, the impact of slower mature economy growth is much 
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more ambiguous (see, for example, Gupta and Ratha 2000; Ferucci et al. 2004). Indeed, 
there is some evidence that slower mature economy growth tends to reduce certain types 
of capital flows (Jeanneau and Micu 2002; Baek 2006; De Vita and Kyaw 2008a).  
 
Similarly, a decline in U.S. interest rates may in principle have the same impact on capital 
flows as an increase in EM interest rates, in which case capital flows can be thought of as 
being driven by interest rate differentials. Indeed, interest rate differentials are often seen as 
an important driver of portfolio flows in the context of the carry trade investment strategy 
(see, for example, Galati et al. 2007). However, analysis of aggregate capital flows 
movements finds little support for the role of interest rate differentials. While mature economy 
interest rates are found to be an important determinant of various types of EM capital 
inflows, the evidence is much more mixed for EM interest rates (e.g., Ahmed and Zlate 2013). 
A complication with estimates of how much local interest rates attract foreign capital flows is 
again endogeneity. Since greater foreign capital flows would tend to reduce local interest 
rates, estimations that do not address endogeneity would tend to obtain coefficients with a 
downward bias, i.e. the impact of domestic interest rates may be understated. Moreover, 
the literature on global interest rate transmission finds that EM interest rates themselves are to 
a significant degree driven by mature economy interest rates (Frankel et al. 2004; Edwards 
2012). Hence, a large negative impulse from an increase in mature economy interest rates 
may lead to a sharp reduction in EM capital flows, but may only result in a small increase in 
the interest rate differential. Therefore, it would be seem more appropriate to explain such a 
reduction in flows with the large increase in mature economy rates rather than a modest rise 
in the interest rate differential. 
 
Overall, the push-pull framework certainly has its limitations, but it continues to be a useful 
analytical perspective for structuring the discussion on the determinants of EM capital flows. 
 
Cyclical vs. Structural Drivers of Capital Flows 
One complementary dimension that may have received insufficient attention in the existing 
literature on country-specific and global factors is the distinction between cyclical and 
structural forces that shape the evolution of capital flows. Cyclical factors are more short-
term in nature and often vary across different phases of the business cycle, such as real GDP 
growth and interest rates. By contrast, structural factors are more long-term in nature, and 
relate to the fundamental structure of an economy, its institutions, and its policy and 
regulatory frameworks. While structural factors typically shape longer-term trends in capital 
flows, abrupt changes in these factors may also have important short-term effects. A prime 
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example would be an emerging market country that undertakes steps towards liberalizing its 
capital account to make it easier for foreigners to invest in its economy. The impact of 
capital account liberalization on foreign investment is among the topics that have received 
significant interest in the literature (e.g., Bartolini and Drazen 1997; Kim and Singal 2000; 
Bekaert et al. 2002). In addition, the longer-term effects of structural forces received 
particular attention in late 1990s and early 2000s literature, which saw some important 
contributions with respect to the rise of institutional investors and information and 
communication technology (including World Bank 1997; Lopez-Mejia 1999; Addison and 
Heshmati 2003). When it comes to explaining aggregate capital flows movements, however, 
there has been much more focus on the cyclical forces shaping capital flows to emerging 
markets. This is especially true for the most recent period since the global financial crisis of 
2008/09, which shifted the focus squarely on the cyclical drivers of capital flows.  
 
Arguably, the distinction between structural and cyclical factors is complementary to that 
between push and pull factors. Pull factors can be structural or cyclical in nature, as can be 
push factors. Figure 7 illustrates this complementarity and provides frequently cited examples 
of capital flows drivers. For example, the rise of institutional investors in mature economies is 
an important structural push driver, while the quality of institutions in emerging markets can 
be regarded as a structural pull driver.  
 
 
Figure 7: Classification of the Main Drivers of Capital Flows 
 
 
Source: author’s illustration. 
 
While structural drivers are clearly of great importance for a more complete understanding 
of international capital flows dynamics, the subsequent discussion will focus on cyclical push 
and pull drivers, both due to space constraints and because they have received the 
greatest attention in the literature on the drivers of capital flows to emerging markets. 
 
 Push  Pull
 Cyclical  Global risk aversion  Domestic output growth
 Mature economy interest rates  Asset return indicators
 Mature economy output growth  Country risk indicators
 Structural  Rise of institutional investors  Quality of institutions
 Portfolio diversification  Capital account openness
 Information & communication technology  Role of government in the economy
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7. Drivers of Capital Flows by Major Component 
 
Prior sections of this paper have established the importance of differentiating between 
various types of capital flows and the continued analytical value of the push-pull framework. 
This section brings these two perspectives together by analyzing the available evidence on 
the main cyclical push and pull drivers for the major capital flows components. For this 
purpose, I consider the four main components of capital flows, namely portfolio equity and 
debt flows, banking flows, and foreign direct investment. In terms of drivers, the discussion 
addresses three push factors (global risk aversion, mature economy interest rates, and 
mature economy output growth) and three pull factors (domestic output growth, asset return 
indicators, and country risk indicators). Figure 8 on page 26 provides a condensed summary 
of the results obtained by over 40 empirical studies. For the most part, the studies considered 
in this summary table focus specifically on individual components of emerging market 
capital flows. Some additional insights can be gained from studies that have a broader 
country focus and/or consider multiple components of capital flows at once (such as Milesi-
Ferretti and Tille 2011, who do not differentiate between flows to emerging and mature 
economies). To the extent that inferences are possible from these studies, they are included 
in the table and the discussion below. 
 
Portfolio Equity and Debt Inflows 
There is very robust evidence that both types of portfolio flows are strongly affected by global 
risk aversion, which has received particular attention since the global financial crisis of 
2008/09. Empirical studies almost universally find a strong and statistically significant impact 
of increases in global risk aversion on portfolio flows to emerging markets (e.g., Milesi-Ferretti 
and Tille 2011; Broner et al. 2013; see Figure 8 and related notes for a full listing of references). 
The most common proxies for investor risk aversion used in the literature are U.S. implied 
equity volatility (as measured by the VIX index or the VXO) and the U.S. BBB-rated corporate 
bond spread over U.S. Treasury securities, which are both found to have a strong 
contemporaneous impact on portfolio flows. There does not seem to be conclusive 
evidence that one type of portfolio flow (debt or equity) is affected more than the other by 
changes in risk appetite. 
 
Numerous studies published during the last 25 years have analyzed the relation of portfolio 
flows with world interest rates (often proxied by U.S. rates) and have overwhelmingly  
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Source: author’s illustration.  
 Figure 8: Overview of the Cyclical Drivers of Non-Resident Capital Flows by Major Component
Driver Portfolio Equity Portfolio Debt Banking Flows FDI
Global risk 
aversion
Strong evidence for negative relationship 
[negative: M&T 2011, F 2012, BDES 2013, R 
2013, A&Z 2013, A&Z 2014, K 2014; 
negative/insignificant: B 2006]
Strong evidence for negative relationship 
[negative: M&T 2011, F 2012, BDES 2013, R 
2013, A&Z 2013, A&Z 2014, K 2014; 
negative/insignificant: B 2006]
Strong evidence for negative relationship 
[negative: J&M 2002, FHST 2004, T 2010, 
M&T 2011, R 2013, B&S 2013, H&M 2013 
B&S 2015]
Mixed evidence, no clear relationship 
[insignificant: ALS 2005; positive/negative: 
BDES 2013; negative: M&T 2011, positive: R 
2013]
Push Mature economy 
interest rates
Strong evidence for negative relationship 
[negative: F 1996, T&S 1997, W 1997, CCM 
1998, M&R 1999, B 2006, FLS 2012, D&V 
2014, FKSS 2014, K 2014; 
negative/insignificant: D&K 2008a; 
insignificant: HMV 2001; A&Z 2013]
Strong evidence for negative relationship 
[negative: F 1996, W 1997, T&S 1997, M&R 
1999, B 2006, D&V 2014, FKSS 2014, K 2014; 
negative/insignificant: D&K 2008a; 
insignificant: HMV 2001, A&Z 2013; greater 
impact than for equity: T&S 1997, K 2014, 
D&V 2014; smaller impact than for equity: 
CCM 1998]
Some evidence for negative relationship 
[negative: GQS 2014, B&S 2015, ; 
positive/negative: G 2002, CCR 2014; 
positive: J&M 2002]
Mixed evidence, no clear relationship 
[insignificant: W 1997, M&R 1999, HMV 2001, 
D&K 2008a; negative: ALS 2005; positive: 
G&R 2000]
Mature economy 
output growth
Some evidence for positive relationship 
[positive/insignificant: B 2006, D&K 2008a, 
F&W 2012; insignificant: A&Z 2013]
Some evidence for positive relationship 
[positive/insignificant: B 2006, D&K 2008a, 
F&W 2012; insignificant: A&Z 2013]
Mixed evidence, no clear relationship 
[insignificant: FHST 2004; positive/negative: 
G 2002; positive: J&M 2002]
Mixed evidence, no clear relationship 
[insignificant: G&R 2000; positive/negative: 
D&K 2008a, ALS 2005]
Domestic output 
growth
Some evidence for positive relationship
[positive: D&K 2008a; positive/insignificant: B 
2006, D&K 2008b, A&Z 2013, K 2014; 
insignificant: F 2012]
Some evidence for positive relationship 
[positive: D&K 2008a; positive/insignificant: B 
2006, D&K 2008b, A&Z 2013, F 2012; K 2014]
Strong evidence for positive relationship 
[positive: J&M 2002, FHST 2004, T 2010, 
H&M 2013, B&S 2013]
Strong evidence for positive relationship
[positive: GNP 1998, HMV 2001, A&H 2003, 
D&K 2008a, D&K 2008b; 
positive/insignificant: GR 2000]
Pull
Asset return 
indicators
Some evidence for positive relationship 
[positive: FOS 2001, F 2012, L 2012, K 2014; 
positive/insignificant: CCM 1998, A&Z 2013]
Some evidence for positive relationship 
[positive: FOS 2001, F 2012, K 2014; 
positive/insignificant: CCM 1998]
Strong evidence for positive relationship 
[positive: FHST 2004, B&S 2013, H&M 2013]
Mixed evidence, no clear relationship 
[insignificant: W 1997; negative: R&R 2003]
Country risk 
indicators
Some evidence for negative relationship 
[negative: W 1997, K&W 2008, D&F 2012; 
negative/positive: H&K 2007]
Some evidence for negative relationship 
[negative: W 1997, K&W 2008, D&F 2012; 
negative/positive: H&K 2007]
Strong evidence for negative relationship
[negative: W 1997, FHST 2004, H&K 2007, 
K&W 2008; negative/insignificant: J&M 2002; 
B&S 2013]
Some evidence for negative relationship 
[negative: R&R 2003, B&D 2006; 
negative/insignificant: ALS 2005; 
negative/positive: K&W 2008; smaller impact 
than for other components: F&H 2001, D&F 
2012]
  Some evidence for negative relationship
  Strong evidence for negative relationship
Type
  Strong evidence for positive relationship
  Some evidence for positive relationship
  Mixed evidence, no clear relationship
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Notes on Figure 8: 
 The matrix summarizes the empirical evidence on the main drivers of EM capital flows for each of the major capital flows components. Findings are 
based on an in-depth review of over 40 studies. For each cell, the relevant studies and their main results are reported in parentheses. For example, 
“positive/insignificant” indicates that each of the studies listed found some evidence for a statistically significant positive relationship as well as 
evidence for a statistically insignificant relationship. Due to space constraints, the studies are listed using abbreviated references. The series of letters 
indicate the initial of the last name for each author, followed by the publication year. For example, “T&S 1997” refers to the paper by Taylor and Sarno 
(1997). A full listing of references is provided below. 
 A color code is used to denote the direction of empirical relationships (see legend below table). “Positive relationship” means that an increase in the 
independent variable leads to an increase in the capital flows component in question. The opposite holds for “negative relationship.” The color code 
also indicates the strength of the empirical evidence for these relationships. “Strong evidence” indicates that the majority of studies find unambiguous 
evidence for a statistically significant relationship between the driver and the capital flows component in question (while there may be other studies 
that do not find a statistically robust relationship). “Some evidence” indicates that most studies agree on the direction of the relationship, but the results 
are sometimes statistically significant and sometimes not. “Mixed evidence” indicates that evidence regarding the direction of the relationship is 
ambiguous and/or most studies have not found a statistically significant relationship. 
 Inevitably, an attempt to summarize the vast body of empirical evidence in a single table requires simplification. For example, no differentiation is 
made between contemporaneous and lagged relationships. In addition, the studies considered make use of widely different empirical approaches, 
including econometric models, datasets, and data frequencies, among others (see Section 5).  
 
List of studies referenced in Figure 8, in chronological order of publication: 
F 1996  Fernandez-Arias (1996) 
T&S 1997 Taylor & Sarno (1997) 
W 1997  World Bank (1997) 
CCM 1998 Chuhan, Claessens & Mamingi (1998) 
GNP 1998 Gastanaga, Nugent & Pashamova (1998) 
M&R 1999 Montiel & Reinhard (1999) 
D&R 2000 Gupta & Ratha (2000) 
F&H 2001 Fernandez-Arias & Hausmann (2001) 
FOS 2001 Froot, O’Connel & Seasholes (2001) 
HMV 2001 Hernandez, Mellado & Valdes (2001) 
G 2002  Goldberg (2002) 
J&M 2002 Jeanneau & Micu (2002) 
A&H 2003 Addison & Heshmati (2003) 
R&R 2003 Reinhart & Rogoff (2003) 
FHST 2004 Ferucci, Herzberg, Soussa & Taylor (2004) 
ALS 2005 Albuquerque, Loayza & Serven (2005) 
B 2006  Baek (2006) 
B&D 2006 Biglaiser & DeRouen (2006) 
H&K 2007 Hooper & Kim (2007) 
D&K 2008a De Vita & Kyaw (2008a) 
D&K 2008b De Vita & Kyaw (2008b) 
K&W 2008 Kim & Wu (2008) 
T 2010  Takats (2010) 
M&T 2011 Milesi-Ferretti & Tille (2011) 
D&F 2012 Daude & Fratzscher (2012) 
F 2012  Fratzscher (2012) 
FLS 2012 Fratzscher, Lo Duca & Straub (2012) 
F&W 2012 Forbes & Warnock (2012) 
L 2012  Lo Duca (2012) 
A&Z 2013 Ahmed & Zlate (2013) 
BDES 2013 Broner, Didier, Erce & Schmukler (2013) 
B&S 2013b Bruno & Shin (2013b) 
H&M 2013 Herrmann & Mihaljek (2013) 
R 2013  Rey (2013) 
A&Z 2014 Ananchotikul & Zhang (2014) 
CCR 2014 Cerutti, Claessens & Ratnovski 2014 
GQS 2014 Ghosh, Qureshi & Sugawara (2014) 
K 2014  Koepke (2014) 
FKSS 2014 Feroli, Kashyap, Schoenholtz & Shin (2014) 
D&V 2014 Dahlhaus & Vasishtha (2014) 
B&S 2015 Bruno & Shin (2015) 
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concluded that an increase in the external interest rate environment tends to exert a 
negative impact on portfolio flows and vice versa. Not all studies distinguish between equity 
and debt flows when analyzing portfolio flows movements, but to the extent that they do, 
most studies considered in this survey find that bond flows are more sensitive to mature 
economy interest rates than equity flows (including Taylor and Sarno 1997; Koepke 2014, and 
Dahlhaus and Vasishtha 2014; an exception is Chuhan et al. 1998).  
 
Studies that do not find a significant relationship between global interest rates and EM 
portfolio flows include Hernandez et al. (2001) and Ahmed and Zlate (2013). Hernandez et al. 
(2001) attribute the result of no significant relationship to the use of low-frequency data 
(namely annual data for the real ex-post international interest rate, measured by U.S. dollar 
3-month Libor minus U.S. CPI inflation and used in a various relatively short sample periods 
between 1987 and 1997). The results in Ahmed and Zlate (2013) are based on the U.S. policy 
interest rate in the pre-crisis period (2002Q1-2008Q2). Their results may be due to the 
limitations of using current policy rates as opposed to more forward-looking measures of 
interest rates that capture investor expectations about future interest rates, be it explicitly as 
in Koepke (2014) and Dahlhaus and Vasishtha (2014) or implicitly by using market-based 
measures of interest rates. 
 
In terms of mature economy output growth, there is limited support for the notion that 
external growth encourages EM portfolio flows. For example, De Vita and Kyaw (2008a) find 
a statistically significant positive relationship in some specifications using a structural VAR 
model, but in alternative specifications the estimated coefficient on the mature economy 
growth variable turns negative (but insignificant). Baek (2006) finds a statistically significant 
positive relationship for portfolio flows to EM Asia, but not to Latin America (where the 
estimated coefficient is negative and insignificant). In addition, Ahmed and Zlate (2013) do 
not find a significant impact of mature economy growth on EM portfolio flows in a panel of 
12 emerging market economies.5 Some further insights are provided by Forbes and Warnock 
(2012), who find that stronger global growth is associated with an increased probability of a 
surge in foreign capital inflows to EMs and a reduced probability of a retrenchment episode. 
While their analysis is focused on total non-resident capital flows, portfolio flows and banking 
flows have generally been the most volatile components of capital flows and thus are likely 
to account for the majority of surge and retrenchment episodes (see also Bluedorn et al. 
2013).  
                                                 
5 Results reported in Section 7 for Ahmed and Zlate (2013) refer to the appendix of their study, where EM and mature 
economy variables are analyzed separately. 
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On the pull side, almost all studies find evidence that domestic economic performance is an 
important driver of portfolio flows, though in many studies, the evidence is not statistically 
robust (particularly for high-frequency data). Studies focusing specifically on the relationship 
between domestic growth and EM portfolio flows include Baek (2006), De Vita and Kyaw 
(2008a), and Ahmed and Zlate (2013), who all find supporting evidence for the role of 
domestic output growth. A caveat is provided by studies using high-frequency proxies for 
portfolio flows, notably fund flows data, which generally find that the importance of 
domestic output growth is smaller at the weekly and monthly data frequencies (e.g., 
Ananchotikul and Zhang 2014; Koepke 2014). This may be partly explained by the fact that 
comprehensive measures of output growth are typically only available on a quarterly basis 
(as for GDP growth), while higher-frequency data such as purchasing manager indices, 
economic surprise indices and growth forecasts may be less reliable and hence less 
important in informing investor decisions. 
 
There is also some evidence that local asset returns serve as a pull factor for portfolio flows. 
The strongest evidence is available for local stock market returns, which a number of studies 
find to be associated with increased portfolio equity and bond inflows. Among the early 
literature, a notable study is Chuhan et al. (1998), which finds some evidence that portfolio 
flows are driven by local stock market returns. Another early study on the relation between 
flows and prices is Froot et al. (2001), which uses custodial data from State Street, one of the 
world’s largest custodian banks, and finds that flows are indeed influenced by past returns. 
Much of the supporting empirical evidence gathered in recent years is based on data on 
flows to EM-dedicated mutual funds and ETFs, including Fratzscher (2012) and Lo Duca 
(2012). The evidence is less conclusive for other asset return indicators, such as domestic 
policy interest rates (e.g., Ahmed and Zlate 2013). There is evidence, however, that return 
volatility dampens foreign portfolio inflows, especially real exchange rate volatility (e.g., 
World Bank 1997; Baek 2006). 
 
There is some evidence that country vulnerability indicators impact portfolio flows, with 
greater country risk reducing inflows. For example, the World Bank (1997) finds that a higher 
external debt to GDP ratio tends to dampen flows. In addition, Kim and Wu (2008) find that 
lower sovereign credit ratings on foreign currency debt tend to reduce flows, particularly for 
long-term debt. An important caveat applies to vulnerability indicators that are closely tied 
to external financing needs, like the current account deficit or the government budget 
deficit. Here, studies generally find that the effect of reduced financing needs outweighs the 
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opposing effect of improved creditworthiness, meaning that deficit reduction tends to 
reduce foreign portfolio inflows and vice versa (Hernandez et al. 2001; Baek 2006). This same 
result is also obtained for banking flows (Takats 2010; Herrmann and Mihaljek 2013) and FDI 
flows (Gupta and Ratha 2000).  
 
Banking Flows 
There is robust evidence that banking flows respond negatively to an increase in global risk 
aversion (and vice versa). This result is obtained by all seven studies included in this survey 
that look specifically at banking flows, spanning a variety of sample periods, country 
samples, and methodologies (see list of references below Figure 8).  
 
By contrast, the evidence is much more mixed for the other cyclical push variables. Overall, 
the evidence seems to suggest that there is some negative impact of higher mature 
economy interest rates on banking flows, but this effect may at times be more than offset by 
the stronger economic and financial environment in which higher interest rates tend to 
prevail (and vice versa). Another reason why the evidence may be more mixed for banking 
flows than for portfolio flows is likely to be the lack of high-frequency data on cross-border 
banking flows. In terms of individual studies, Bruno and Shin (2015) find the expected 
negative relationship for the 1995-2007 period, using BIS locational banking statistics (which 
are broadly consistent with capital flows as measured in the balance of payments; see 
Takats 2010 and BIS 2012). The authors focus on the role of the banking sector in transmitting 
U.S. monetary policy internationally. They argue that banks’ financing costs are closely tied 
to central bank policy rates, and hence affect banks’ willingness to lend internationally, 
including to local banks in emerging economies. This effect is amplified by a risk-taking 
channel, in which measured risks decline during periods of low interest rates as borrowers’ 
creditworthiness improves. In addition, Ghosh et al. (2014b) find a negative impact of U.S. 
real interest rates on cross-border banking flows to a sample of 76 countries, both emerging 
and mature (also based on BIS locational banking statistics).  
 
However, an earlier BIS study by Jeanneau and Micu (2002) finds a positive relationship 
between higher global interest rates and banking flows to emerging markets. The authors 
focus on the 1985-2000 period and use semi-annual data from the BIS consolidated banking 
statistics database. Note that these data are not consistent with balance of payments data 
as they include international banks’ local claims, i.e. loans by their subsidiaries (Takats 2010; 
BIS 2012). The explanation offered by the authors is that higher interest rates in mature 
economies reflect stronger economic conditions that result in improved confidence of 
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international lenders, which may encourage cross-border bank lending. Another study by 
Goldberg (2002) uses micro-level U.S. banking data from banks’ regulatory filings for the 
1984-2000 period. She obtains mixed results on this relationship, with the sign of the 
coefficient depending on the model specification and with different results for U.S. lending to 
Latin America compared to EM Asia (for which there is more consistent evidence that higher 
interest rates lead to higher bank lending). Cerutti et al. (2014) provide mixed evidence for a 
sample of 77 countries (mature and emerging), finding that U.S. real interest rates are 
positively associated with cross-border bank flows, while the term premium shows the 
expected negative relationship. 
 
Evidence for the role of mature economy output growth in driving banking flows is also 
mixed across various studies. Jeanneau and Micu (2002) find that cross-border bank lending 
to EMs has been pro-cyclical in the period from 1985 to 2000, with stronger external growth 
leading to increased lending activity. The authors estimate a panel model with semi-annual 
data, using BIS cross-border bank claims as dependent variable and detrended real GDP of 
all lending countries in dollar terms as the explanatory variable. Subsequent studies that used 
lower-frequency quarterly data did not confirm this result, however. For example, Ferucci et 
al. (2004) find no statistically significant relationship with mature market growth, in a panel 
model estimated with BIS data for the period from 1986 to 2003. Goldberg (2002) focuses on 
U.S. bank lending activity in the 1984-2000 period using data from bank filings. She finds that 
stronger U.S. growth boosts lending to Latin America, but tends to reduce lending to EM Asia. 
 
Regarding pull drivers, there is strong evidence for the roles of domestic output growth and 
domestic return indicators in driving banking flows. Studies focusing on domestic output 
growth include Ferucci et al. (2004), Bruno and Shin (2013) and Herrmann and Mihaljek 
(2013). These same studies also consider a variety of local asset returns and find evidence for 
a significant role of stock market returns, local currency appreciation, and especially 
banking sector equity performance in attracting foreign bank inflows. A caveat is that most 
of these studies are based on BIS data on cross-border bank claims, rather than data taken 
directly from the balance of payments (which are often not available for banking flows 
exclusively).  
 
There is also robust evidence for the role of country risk indicators in driving banking flows. 
Jeanneau and Micu (2002) and Ferucci et al. (2004) find some evidence that a higher 
external debt ratio tends to reduce banking inflows. Hooper and Kim (2007) find that a 
higher institutional investor credit rating tends to boost banking flows. In addition, there is 
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evidence that lower sovereign ratings by credit rating agencies tend to reduce banking 
inflows (Kim and Wu 2008). In a recent study, Bruno and Shin (2013) look at the government 
debt to GDP ratio and find some evidence that greater indebtedness deters banking inflows, 
although this result is statistically insignificant in alternative specifications.  
 
Looking beyond the selected variables considered in Figure 8, the literature on the drivers of 
banking flows identifies several other important determinants. For example, various studies 
emphasize the importance of the quality of institutions for banking flows, such as low 
corruption and a high-quality legal system (e.g., Papaioannou 2009) as well as a lower 
opacity index (Hooper and Kim 2007). “Gravity” effects are also found to be an important 
determinant of banking flows (i.e., geographic proximity tends to encourage inflows; see, for 
example, Buch 2005; Herrmann and Mihaljek 2013). In addition, bank health in lender 
countries is found to be an important push factor behind EM banking inflows (McGuire and 
Tarashev 2008; Herrmann and Mihaljek 2013).  
 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Out of the major capital flows components, FDI inflows to emerging markets are the least 
affected by global cyclical developments. Regarding the impact of changes in risk aversion, 
the empirical results are ambiguous and inconclusive: some studies find a positive 
relationship (e.g., Rey 2013, who looks at correlations between the VIX and FDI inflows to 
various EM regions), some studies find a negative relationship (e.g., Milesi-Ferretti and Tille 
2011, who emphasize that the impact of risk shocks on FDI flows is smaller than for other 
components, looking at flows to both mature and emerging markets), and some studies find 
no relationship (e.g., Albuquerque et al. 2005). 
 
There is more consensus in the literature about the impact of global interest rates on FDI 
flows, with the majority of empirical analyses finding no statistically significant relationship 
between the two. There are some exceptions, however. For example, Albuquerque et al. 
(2005) find that a measure of the average G3 interest rate negatively impacts FDI inflows to 
a country sample that includes emerging and mature economies. On the other hand, 
Gupta and Ratha (2000) find a strong positive relationship between FDI flows and 
international real interest rates.  
 
When it comes to mature economy output growth, the literature again does not find a 
consistent relationship with FDI flows. Several studies obtain mixed results depending on the 
model specification (e.g., De Vita and Kyaw 2008a), while others find no statistically 
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significant relationship (Gupta and Ratha 2000). Albuquerque et al. (2005) find evidence for 
a negative impact of global growth on FDI flows to developing countries, but in an earlier 
version of their analysis (2002) provide a case study suggesting a positive relationship 
between global output growth and vertical FDI flows (i.e. production that is part of an 
integrated international supply chain and that satisfies demand outside the host country). 
Indeed, from a theoretical standpoint it seems plausible that the role of global growth differs 
for horizontal FDI (which replicates the same stage of production in various countries to 
satisfy demand in the local market) and vertical FDI. It seems plausible that vertical FDI would 
be more closely related to fluctuations in external demand, while the impetus for horizontal 
FDI is likely to depend to a greater extent on the performance of the host country’s 
economy (Aizenmann and Marion 2004). Testing this hypothesis would seem to be a 
promising area for future research. 
 
On the pull side, domestic output growth stands out as the most important driver of FDI inflows 
to emerging markets. Most studies find unambiguous results in support of such a relationship 
(e.g., Gastanaga et al. 1998; Hernandez et al. 2001; De Vita and Kyaw 2008a), with few 
exceptions (e.g., Gupta and Ratha 2000).  
 
By contrast, most asset return indicators are unlikely to have a close relationship with FDI 
flows, given the longer-term nature of these investments. There are few empirical studies that 
focus specifically on the relation between asset returns and FDI, but there is some evidence 
that return volatility deters FDI, including World Bank (1997) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2003). 
Other studies that focus mainly on mature economy FDI inflows suggest that such inflows are 
encouraged by local exchange rate depreciation, including Froot and Stein (1991) and Klein 
and Rosengren (1994). In addition, Abbott et al. (2012) find that emerging markets with fixed 
exchange rates or intermediate regimes tend to attract more FDI inflows than countries with 
flexible exchange rates.  
 
Country characteristics that make economies vulnerable to crises tend to deter foreign 
direct investment. While there is generally less evidence for a negative effect from external 
vulnerability indicators (such as foreign indebtedness), many studies find that domestic 
governance matters significantly. For example, a smaller size of government in the economy 
(measured as government consumption relative to GDP) tends to encourage FDI 
(Albuquerque et al. 2005), as do reduced expropriation risk and privatization efforts (Biglaiser 
and DeRouen 2006). There is evidence, however, that country vulnerabilities affect FDI less 
than the other components of capital flows. This caveat was first advanced by Fernandez-
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Arias and Hausmann (2001), who find that more vulnerable emerging markets generally 
receive less foreign capital, but FDI accounts for a greater share of those inflows. In a more 
recent study, Daude and Fratzscher (2008) find that FDI flows are less sensitive to the quality 
of institutions than other types of capital flows, particularly portfolio equity and debt flows. 
 
Besides the literature on the drivers of EM capital flows, there is a separate literature that 
addresses the unique determinants of FDI flows. A helpful overview of this literature is 
provided by Blonigen (2005), who considers FDI flows to all countries without differentiating 
between emerging and mature economies. Some of the unique factors include the tax 
regime (with lower taxes supporting greater inward FDI), trade protection (with some 
evidence that greater protection increases inward FDI to circumvent trade barriers), the 
strength of bilateral trade relations (since FDI can sometimes serve as a substitute for exports), 
exchange rate effects (with currency depreciation leading to increased inward FDI), and 
gravity effects. In addition, strong institutions, good governance and low corruption are also 
found to be important factors in attracting FDI flows (e.g., Gastanaga et al. 1998; Biglaiser 
and DeRouen 2006). 
 
  
 
8. Conclusion 
 
This survey has provided an overview of the empirical findings on the drivers of capital flows 
to emerging markets. The time-tested push-pull framework remains a very useful albeit 
imperfect way to structure the wealth of empirical evidence gathered in the literature. While 
most of the empirical work focuses on the cyclical drivers of capital flows, a more complete 
understanding can be achieved by considering secular forces such as the rise of institutional 
investors, trends in global portfolio diversification, and changes in the institutional framework 
in EM economies. 
 
Within the push-pull framework, the literature has firmly established that both external and 
domestic factors matter for capital flows. A comprehensive review of the available evidence 
provides quite detailed guidance on the relative importance of these two sets of factors for 
different types of capital flows. Cyclical push factors like global risk aversion and mature 
economy interest rates are found to be most important for portfolio equity and debt flows. 
Evidence for banking flows suggests a significant role for both external factors (risk aversion 
and to a lesser extent foreign interest rates) and a range of country-specific factors 
(including domestic growth, country vulnerability indicators, and domestic asset returns, 
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particularly in the banking sector). By contrast, evidence for the role of external factors is 
very mixed when it comes to foreign direct investment. Instead, FDI is found to be driven by 
country-specific factors like real GDP growth, as well as a number of factors that are specific 
to FDI flows. 
 
In addition, there is robust evidence that the relative importance of push and pull factors 
varies over time, which is in part due to the fact that the relative magnitude of external and 
domestic shocks varies over time. Two contrasting periods are the mid-2000s global 
expansion, where push factors appear to have been relatively less important, versus the 
global financial crisis of 2008/09, which saw a sharp push shock for EM capital flows in the 
form of a surge in global risk aversion (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille 2011; Lo Duca 2012). Overall, the 
answer to the popular question of whether push or pull factors are more important in driving 
capital flows thus depends not only on the types of capital flows considered, but also on the 
time period, among other factors. A further caveat is that push and pull factors are 
interrelated. This complication receives substantial attention in the literature, beginning with 
the seminal work of Fernandez-Arias (1996), who analyzed the boost to EM borrowers’ 
creditworthiness provided by a decline in U.S. interest rates. This theme is also picked up in 
the more recent literature, such as the study by Bruno and Shin (2015) on the risk-taking 
channel of monetary policy. 
 
These findings have important policy implications. Policy challenges typically arise when a 
country experiences either large inflows or abrupt outflows of foreign capital. The 
appropriate policy response to surges and reversals of capital flows depends on the extent 
to which these are driven by domestic versus external factors (Calvo et al. 1993). For 
example, if unduly large inflows are attracted predominantly by a strong domestic 
economy, a combination of fiscal tightening and exchange rate appreciation may be 
warranted. If, on the other hand, flows are primarily driven by a temporary decline in foreign 
interest rates, this may warrant additional reserve accumulation as a buffer for when 
favorable external conditions reverse (Ostry et al. 2010). This survey has shown that the drivers 
of capital flows depend crucially on the specific flows considered, particularly in terms of 
instruments, investor types, recipient sector, currency denomination, and other factors. 
Therefore, policymakers need to take into account the composition of observed capital 
flows in order to assess how vulnerable a country’s sources of external financing are to a 
deterioration in factors that are beyond its control. For example, the central bank of a 
country that has previously received large inflows in the form of portfolio debt should be 
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more concerned about an abrupt increase in foreign interest rates than if the inflows had 
been in the form of FDI or even bank lending.  
 
Several promising avenues for further research emerge from this survey. The first is a more 
systematic effort to disentangle cyclical and structural factors driving capital flows to 
emerging markets. This would be particularly valuable given that a number of structural 
changes in the international financial system are likely to play an important role in driving 
capital flows going forward. Examples include the increasing role of emerging markets as 
source countries for capital inflows to other EM economies (“south-south flows”), as well as 
the growing popularity of passive investment vehicles like exchange-traded funds (ETFs), with 
global assets held by ETFs growing from around $97 billion in 2000 to about $2.7 trillion in 2014 
(McKinsey 2011; State Street Global Advisors 2015). A better understanding of the interplay of 
these forces with cyclical effects would enable a more holistic understanding of the drivers 
of capital flows. 
 
Other promising areas of research include those potential driving forces whose role has not 
been ascertained conclusively by the extant empirical literature, such as the impact of 
various external factors for FDI flows. One specific example would be the relationship 
between mature economy growth and FDI inflows to emerging markets, where the 
theoretical case for external growth boosting vertical FDI seems compelling, but empirical 
evidence is scarce. Recent improvements in data availability may facilitate such research. 
For example, since 2009 the IMF has provided bilateral data on the total stock of direct 
investment from one country to another (Mink et al. 2012) as part of its annual coordinated 
direct investment surveys (CDIS). Such data may allow more nuanced insights about the role 
of output growth in source countries in determining FDI inflows to emerging markets. Similar 
advances may be possible for portfolio flows, where recent efforts have focused on 
developing high-frequency measures of portfolio flows that track balance of payments 
data. Examples include the databases on monthly and daily portfolio flows data compiled 
by the Institute of International Finance, which are broadly consistent with BoP principles 
(Koepke and Mohammed 2014b). Such high-frequency data may be particularly useful for 
assessing the role of volatile asset returns and would also make it possible to conduct event 
studies related to the announcement of unconventional monetary policy measures (which 
thus far have generally relied on proxies for capital flows, such as fund flows data). 
 
A final area of research would be a more systematic assessment of how drivers differ 
between flows to emerging and mature economies, and the extent to which emerging 
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markets are treated as a homogenous group. Emerging markets are generally perceived to 
be a riskier asset class, which is reflected in the volatility of capital flows (Bluedorn et al. 2013). 
Nonetheless, emerging economies are quite heterogeneous in their economic structures 
and level of development. A deeper understanding of how such fundamental country 
characteristics affect the importance of various capital flows drivers would be valuable. 
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